Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology by Schindler, Thomas
                          Schindler, T. (2021). Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their
Ontology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1887302
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY-NC-ND
Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/00048402.2021.1887302
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Taylor and Francis
at https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1887302 .Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rajp20
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajp20
Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their
Ontology
Thomas Schindler
To cite this article: Thomas Schindler (2021): Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their
Ontology, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2021.1887302
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1887302
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 22 Mar 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 431
View related articles 
View Crossmark data




I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which
properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere
quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose
a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of
properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory
overcomes the problem of inexpressible properties, but its formulation presupposes
the existence of various kinds of abstract objects. I discuss some ways to reduce
these existence assumptions, but ultimately suggest that deflationists can hardly
avoid quantification over abstract objects of one sort or another. I conclude that
property deflationism is perhaps not as deflationary as some philosophers want it
to be, but that it’s still apt to call the position ‘deflationary’.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 12 June 2020; Revised 12 January 2021
KEYWORDS properties; deflationism; ontology; minimalism about truth
1. Introduction
There’s a well-known tradition in philosophy that considers properties as ‘shadows of
predicates’. This tradition contrasts starkly with more substantial views of properties,
such as trope theory or the theory that properties are (immanent) universals. In this
paper, I shall be concerned with some recent theories of the first kind, which are mod-
elled on deflationary theories of truth. Accordingly, I’ll call them ‘deflationary theories
of properties’.
By a deflationary theory of properties, I understand any theory of properties based
on some version of the following two core theses.
The first core thesis is that the notion of property is governed by instances of some
comprehension schema, such as this:
An object a has the property of being F if and only if a is F (COMP)
(We’ll have a look at another comprehension schema in due course.) Unless some non-
classical logic is adopted, deflationists cannot accept such comprehension schemata
unrestrictedly, due to Russell-like paradoxes. Resolving the paradoxes is a notoriously
difficult problem. For simplicity, I’ll assume that comprehension schemata are
restricted to predicates of the base language—that is, the language without property
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terms. While this is perhaps excessively restrictive, it won’t affect the main points of
this paper.
The first thesis has been endorsed by various schools. It’s the second thesis that is
distinctive of deflationism.
The second core thesis is that the raison d’être of our property talk is that it serves a
quasi-logical function, akin to our truth talk. A version of this thesis was, to the best of
my knowledge, first proposed by Charles Parsons [1983], who observed that property
talk answers a need to generalise predicate places in our language, just as truth talk
answers a need to generalise sentence places in our language. More recently, versions
of this thesis have been defended by Hofweber [2006, 2016] and Båve [2015].
Our property talk serves its generalising function in virtue of being governed by
some comprehension axioms. The particular choice of axioms may vary from one
theory to another. I’ll call collections of such axioms ‘formal theories of properties’,
and use ‘deflationary theory of properties’ for the combination of a formal theory
with a particular deflationary conception of properties—that is, a set of (meta-
language) claims that comprises at least some version of the second core thesis
above and the Quinean background assumptions listed below.
Some deflationists consider their theories as linguistic theories about the ordinary
language usage of ‘property’. Others care little about ordinary language usage, claiming
that when we’re in the business of ‘limning down the true and ultimate structure of
reality’ we need to appeal to the ‘austere canonical notation for science’ [Quine
1960: 221, 225]. Adherents of this view consider their (formal) theories as proposals
about how to use ‘property’ in our philosophical or scientific theorising. (The defla-
tionist may, of course, go beyond Quine by allowing, say, modal operators in their
notation for science. Since Quine only accepted talk about extensionally individuated
entities, he doesn’t qualify as a property deflationist, in my sense anyway.) I’m inter-
ested just in the second interpretation, and consequently ignore questions about our
ordinary language usage of ‘property’.
Deflationary theories of properties are usually formulated against the backdrop of
the following Quinean thesis: Predicates don’t name—in particular, they don’t name
properties—and, additionally, using and understanding predicates doesn’t involve
some kind of apprehension of such things as properties, concepts, or classes.1
Against this backdrop, deflationists view property terms as ‘nominalisations’ of pre-
dicates, whose sole purpose is to increase the expressive power of our language: in first-
order languages we cannot quantify into predicate positions, but the introduction of
property terms enables us, via some suitable comprehension axioms, to generalise
(indirectly) on predicate places in our language. Presumably, the effect of quantifying
into predicate positions could also be achieved by introducing suitable higher-order
quantifiers. But the introduction of property terms allows us to achieve this effect in
a grammatically conservative way—that is, without abandoning the convenient frame-
work of first-order logic.
Deflationism is first and foremost a thesis about the function of property talk; it can
be combined with different views about what, if anything, property terms denote. For
instance, Schiffer [2003] considers properties as pleonastic entities. However, there’s a
1 The view is elaborated by Devitt [1980]. See Van Cleve [1994] for an argument as to why properties aren’t
needed to account for predication, and Parsons [1999] for why there’s no truth-maker argument against
nominalism.
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recent trend to combine deflationism with nominalism about properties [Båve 2015;
Hofweber 2016].
In this paper I won’t argue for or against deflationism, as opposed to a more sub-
stantial account of properties. Instead, I’ll critically examine a number of deflationary
theories with an eye as to which of them are tenable or coherent by the deflationist’s
own light. I’ll be especially interested in what ideological and ontological commitments
they incur. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist account of properties, which is
attractive in so far as it rests on minimal ideological and ontological assumptions. I
argue, however, that internalism faces a serious challenge. In section 3, I introduce a
theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth.
This theory is coherent (if minimalism is), and overcomes the limitations of internal-
ism, but its formulation requires the existence of various kinds of abstract objects. Sub-
sequently, I discuss whether deflationists can reduce their commitments by talking of
possible predicates (section 4), by adopting a second-order language (section 5), or by
adopting an error-theoretic view, as Båve [2015] suggests (section 6). I conclude that
deflationism isn’t as deflationary as some philosophers might want or expect it to be,
but that it’s still apt to call the position deflationary (section 7). I hope that both friends
and opponents of deflationism will benefit from this investigation.
2. Hofweber’s Internalist Theory of Properties
Deflationism about properties, and internalism in particular, is best understood by
comparing it to deflationism about truth [Field 1994; Horwich 1998b]. According to
the latter, the sole reason why we have the predicate ‘true’ in our language is that it
enables us to express statements that otherwise would be very difficult or impossible
to express. For example, suppose that you want to express agreement with a remark
of Einstein’s but can’t quite remember what he said. Then the truth predicate comes
in handy, enabling you to say ‘What Einstein said is true.’ According to deflationists,
this statement is equivalent to (although not synonymous with) something like ‘If Ein-
stein said that A1 then A1, and if Einstein said that A2 then A2, and so on’, which
doesn’t contain the concept of truth at all. In a similar vein, the internalist claims
that a generalisation such as ‘There’s a property x such that Plato has x and Aristotle
has x’ is equivalent (in virtue of (COMP)) to the infinite disjunction ‘⋁i (Fi(Plato) ∧
Fi (Aristotle))’, where F1, F2, . . . is an enumeration of all unary predicates (that is, for-
mulas with one free variable) of the base language. Recall that, by Quine’s thesis, none
of these predications involves reference to or apprehension of properties. Thus [Hof-
weber 2006: 158],
talk about properties is not talk about some language-independent domain of objects, and
maybe even not talk about some domain of objects at all. Rather properties are mere
shadows of predicates, as the metaphor goes, and quantification over them is a device that
increases our expressive power in a certain purely logical or metaphysically thin way: quantifi-
cation over properties is nothing but a generalization over the instances. According to this view
such quantified statements will be truth-conditionally equivalent to infinite disjunctions or
conjunctions of the instances.
Although property-theoretic generalisations are equivalent to infinite conjunctions or
disjunctions that don’t contain any property terms, the generalisation itself does
contain some. According to loose internalism, property terms denote objects, although
these are mind- and language-dependent. By contrast, strict internalism denies that
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property terms denote, even if they occur in true statements [ibid.: 159]. In later work,
Hofweber has argued for strict internalism [2016: sec. 8.4]. The details need not inter-
est us here, as everything that I’ll say applies to both versions.
Internalism is subject to a powerful objection—namely, that it gets the truth-con-
ditions of quantified statements wrong because there are properties that cannot be
expressed by a predicate of our actual language. Of course, Hofweber is well aware
of this objection. I cannot do full justice to his rich discussion, and so I’ll concentrate
on one particular but important aspect of his theory that I find especially troublesome.
An aspect onwhich Iwon’t focus isHofweber’s use of parameterised predicates—that
is, predicates containing additional free variables. This allows him to discharge the
objection that there are uncountably many properties but only countably many
expressions in our language. However, the use of parameterised predicates plays little
role in the objection considered below, as Hofweber acknowledges [ibid.: sec. 9.4.1].
There’s an inductive argument for thinking there are inexpressible properties:
There are properties, such as that of being a quark or of being a transfinite cardinal
number, that we are now—but that our ancestors (presumably) weren’t—able to
express. Similarly, it’s reasonable to expect that future generations will be able to
express properties that we can’t.
However, that our ancestors didn’t possess the predicate ‘is a quark’ doesn’t imply
they weren’t able to express the property of being a quark: it might be possible, using
only the vocabulary of our ancestors, to form some predicate that expresses the prop-
erty in question. (Whether our ancestors ever used that predicate is irrelevant.) Hof-
weber offers the following story. Let’s assume that [ibid.: 240, my emphasis]
‘being a quark’ is a theoretical predicate of physics. It’s at least in part implicitly defined by the
physical theory that uses it. Thus we can express it because we have the theory. […] If [this] is
correct then the problem of expressing the property of being a quark [in a language that doesn’t
yet contain the predicate ‘is a quark’] reduces to expressing the theory that implicitly defines
‘being a quark’, plus making the implicit definition explicit. Simply put, the property of being
a quark is the property of being such that the theory truly describes you. Thus the problem
is pushed back to the properties used in the implicit definition of ‘being a quark’, that is in
the formulation of the theory that implicitly defines it.
What does it mean to make ‘the implicit definition explicit’? One can find two notions
of implicit definition in the literature.
First, there’s a logical notion which goes roughly like this. Let T be a theory in some
language L and ‘F’ be a predicate of L. ‘F’ is implicitly definable in T iff, for all models
M1, M2 of T, the following holds: if M1, M2 agree on the interpretation of every pre-
dicate other than ‘F’, then M1, M2 also agree on the interpretation of ‘F’. Now, Beth’s
theorem tells us that if ‘F’ is implicitly definable in T, then ‘F’ is explicitly definable in T.
Thus, if ‘F’ is implicitly definable in this sense, Hofweber’s account works well.
The second notion is often associated with Hilbert. Roughly, the idea is that we can
introduce (in mathematics, at least) a predicate by laying down some axioms governing
the predicate. For example, some deflationists think that the Tarski-biconditionals
implicitly define the notion of truth. According to this view, truth is implicitly
defined in the Hilbertian sense, although it’s not implicitly definable in the logical
one, due to Tarski’s Theorem. Therefore, there’s no explicit definition of truth in
the logical sense.
Now consider the following scenario. Let ‘F’ be some primitive predicate of our
language, which we assume to be implicitly defined (in Hilbert’s sense) by some
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theory Th(F). Let C be some community that uses a language, L, exactly like ours,
except that L doesn’t contain the predicate ‘F’. How can members of C express the
property of being an F in L? How can they make the implicit definition ‘explicit’?
Hofweber’s remark that the property can be defined as ‘the property of being such
that the theory truly describes you’ suggests the following: the property of being F can
be expressed in L by something like the Ramsey sentence of the theory that implicitly
defines ‘F’. Thus, take the axioms of Th(F) and replace every occurrence of ‘F’ by a
second-order variable ‘V’. Now take the conjunction of the axioms, resulting in
some long (but finite) second-order formula Th(V ). Then one may claim that the fol-
lowing predicate expresses the property of being an F in L:
∃V(Th(V) ^ V(x)) (1)
There are two problems with this suggestion. First, it’s not clear how to interpret (1)
in the present context. It’s futile to interpret the second-order quantifier substitution-
ally, because we’re trying to find a predicate expressing the property of being F in L. On
the substitutional interpretation, (1) will express that property only if we already
assume that there’s such a predicate. It might be suggested that we can interpret the
second-order quantifier plurally (see Boolos [1984]). However, this doesn’t work if
the formulation of Th(F) involves the use of modal operators, because pluralities are
extensionally individuated (see section 5). (A similar remark applies to sets and
classes.)
However, let’s set aside this problem and consider the second, more substantial,
problem. Assume that ‘F’ is implicitly defined by an infinite set of axioms. Mathematics
provides many examples of theories that aren’t finitely axiomatisable, such as Peano
arithmetic or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. In such a scenario, it’s not even possible
to form the conjunction of the axioms of Th(F). (Note that the internalist cannot
appeal to an infinite conjunction, because she claims that every property is expressed
by a predicate of our actual finitary language.)
To be sure, most infinitely axiomatised theories can be finitely axiomatised by using
additional predicates—that is, predicates extraneous to the vocabulary of the theory.
Due to a result of Kleene’s [1952], it’s known that every recursively axiomatisable
theory without identity, and every recursively axiomatisable theory with identity
that has only infinite models, can be finitely axiomatised by using additional predi-
cates. Roughly, given some infinitely axiomatised theory Th(F) satisfying the con-
straints just mentioned, one introduces a finitely axiomatised fragment of an
(arithmetised) syntax theory and a finitely axiomatised truth theory for the language
of Th(F), and replaces the infinitely many axioms of Th(F) by the axiom ‘All
axioms of Th(F) are true.’ The theory T*, so obtained, is finitely axiomatised and a con-
servative extension of the original theory Th(F).
However, there are three problems with invoking Kleene’s result in the present
context. I present them in order of increasing strength.
(i) The formulation of T* requires that L contain a singular term referring to the
predicate ‘F’, because T* needs to include the axiom that all axioms of Th(F)
are true. Assume that the members of the community C populate some poss-
ible world different from ours. Then reference to ‘F’ in L amounts to reference
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to a merely possible predicate (from the perspective of the world of C.) Now, I
don’t wish to imply that it’s impossible to refer to merely possible predicates,
but the appeal to merely possible predicates doesn’t sit well with internalism.
After all, internalists claim that every property can be expressed by a predicate
of the actual language. But now it turns out that some of these predicates
involve reference to predicates that aren’t available in the actual language.
Although this isn’t inconsistent, it’s not internalist in spirit either.
(ii) The formulation of T* relies on the availability of predicates extraneous to the
vocabulary of Th(F). Can we be sure these predicates are available in L? Note
that Kleene’s method requires a truth predicate for the language in which Th
(F) is formulated. Suppose that the language of Th(F) is L ⋃ {F}. Then the
required truth predicate cannot be defined in L ⋃ {F} (and consequently
not in L) because, by Tarski’s Theorem, one cannot define a (classical) truth
predicate for a language in the very same language.
(iii) There are recursively axiomatisable theories that aren’t finitely axiomatisable
even if additional predicates are used [Craig and Vaught 1958: theorem 4.3].
Indeed, one can show that a theory T is finitely axiomatisable by using
additional predicates iff there’s a second-order formula A of the form
∃V1 . . . ∃Vn B (where B is first-order) such that T and A have the same
models [ibid: 292]. It follows that if a predicate is implicitly defined by a
theory that isn’t finitely axiomatizable by using additional predicates, then—
even if (i) and (ii) are solved—we simply cannot make the implicit definition
‘explicit’ by a formula of the form (1).
I conclude that Hofweber’s strategy of dealing with properties expressed by implicitly
defined predicates fails when the predicate is implicitly defined by a theory that isn’t
finitely axiomatisable. This doesn’t entail that the internalist’s thesis—that all properties
are expressible by predicates of our actual language—is false. It’s difficult to refute such a
modal claim, because the internalist can simply respond that, although the proposed sol-
utiondoesn’twork, someother strategywill—we just haven’t discovered it yet.However,
given our strong intuition that there are in fact inexpressible properties, the burden of
proof lies surely on the internalist’s side. Consequently, for the remainder of the paper
I’ll assume that there are inexpressible properties.
3. Extending Horwich’s Minimalist Theory of Truth to Properties
I’ve argued that the internalist response to the problem of inexpressible properties fails.
Since deflationism about properties is modelled on deflationism about truth, perhaps
we can make progress by reconsidering the latter. As is well-known, truth deflationism
comes in (at least) two versions—disquotationalism and minimalism.
The axioms of the disquotationalist’s formal theory of truth consist of all instances
of the T-schema: ‘p’ is true if and only if p. A generalisation such as ‘Every sentence is
true or false’ is easily seen to be equivalent to the following infinite conjunction: Li(Ai
∨ ¬Ai), where A1, A2, A3, . . . is an enumeration of all sentences of the base language.
Now, if we were merely interested in generalising over sentences of the actual language,
disquotationalism would be enough. Similarly, if we were interested merely in general-
ising over predicates of the actual language, internalism would be enough.
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Some philosophers find disquotationalism too restrictive. This has prompted
Horwich to base his minimalist theory on propositions, rather than sentences, as
truth bearers. Now, internalism is essentially the property-theoretic counterpart of dis-
quotationalism. Perhaps one can overcome the limitations of internalism by taking
some inspiration from minimalism. It will be instructive to have a closer look at the
axioms of Horwich’s formal theory, MT.
Minimalism about truth. MT is often presented as if its axioms consisted of all
instances of the schema ‘The proposition that p is true iff p’, where ‘p’ is a placeholder
for a sentence of our (actual) language. However, such a theory wouldn’t be very
different from the disquotationalist one: it wouldn’t provide an axiom for those prop-
ositions that aren’t (yet) expressible. Indeed, the axioms of MT aren’t comprised of
sentences at all; they consist in propositions such as this:
snow is white〈 〉 is true iff snow is white〈 〉 (2)
Here, the angle brackets are a notational device that, when surrounding an expression
e, yield a singular term denoting the propositional constituent expressed by e. Thus
‘⟨snow is white⟩’ is a singular term denoting the proposition that snow is white, and
‘⟨green⟩’ is a singular term denoting the concept green [Horwich 1998b: 17–20].
In the present context, one needs of course to remember that, for the minimalist,
‘the notion of proposition [and concept does] not depend on the notion of truth’
[ibid.: 16], but instead is explained in terms of basic usage, ‘where usage is character-
ized non-semantically, in terms of circumstances of application, contribution to the
assertibility conditions and inferential role of containing sentences, etc’ [ibid.: 93].
Moreover, Horwich admits quantification over inexpressible propositions, claiming
that every proposition is expressible by a sentence in some possible language [ibid.: 19].
Nevertheless, since some propositions aren’t expressible by any actual sentence, we
cannot actually express all axioms of MT. However, Horwich claims that it’s possible to
define a function E whose image (that is, the collection of its outputs) comprises all
axioms of MT. For example, E maps ⟨snow is white⟩ to (2). Defining E requires
care: Horwich’s own attempt is confused, as Button [2014] demonstrated. Fortunately,
this problem admits a straightforward solution (see Schindler and Schlöder [ms.]).
Horwich characterisesMT as follows: an object x is an axiomofMT iff there’s a y such
that x = E(y), where E is the ‘propositional structure’ or ‘function’ ⟨⟨p⟩ is true ↔ p⟩
[1998b: 17–20]. This isn’t well defined because ‘y’ is an individual variable, whereas
‘p’ is a placeholder for a sentence.
To define MT properly, we need to think of propositions as structured. It’s con-
venient to think of propositions as singular propositions—that is, composed of
objects and concepts. Horwich accepts the existence of singular propositions [ibid.:
91], although one needs to remember that minimalists characterise propositions and
concepts in a non-semantic manner.
E can be defined in terms of some propositional functions. These functions can in
turn be defined by definite descriptions. For example, consider the function NOT that
maps a proposition to its negation. For propositions that can be expressed by sen-
tences, we can indicate its output using angle brackets: NOT(⟨p⟩) = ⟨¬p⟩. Here, ‘p’ is
a placeholder for an (actual) sentence. Note that the equation is meaningless unless
‘p’ is replaced by a sentence: The angle brackets denote the propositional constituent
expressed by the enclosed expression, and the placeholder ‘p’ doesn’t express any
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propositional constituent. Nevertheless, we can define NOT properly like so:
NOT(y) =Df the proposition that is the negation of y,
where (crucially) ‘y’ is an individual variable ranging over (inexpressible) propositions.
Similarly, given some predicate, we can define a function that maps an object x to
the proposition that x falls under the concept expressed by the predicate. For example,
GREEN(x) =Df the proposition that x is green.
TRUE(x) =Df the proposition that x is true.
To proceed, we need further functions corresponding to the connectives of prop-
ositional logic, specifically the binary functions BC and COND, corresponding to
the biconditional and material conditional, respectively.
Again, for propositions that can be expressed by sentences, we can use angle brack-









〈 〉( ) = p  q〈 〉
But the proper definition of these functions is by definite description, and involves
variables ranging over (inexpressible) propositions.
We now have the ingredients with which to characterise the axioms of MT:
v is an axiom of MT iff there′s a proposition x such that v = E(x),
where E(x) = BC(TRUE(x), x)
This is well-defined, and yields a comprehensive theory, because, even for those prop-
ositions x that cannot be expressed by a sentence, we can refer to the corresponding
axiom, E(x). Where x is expressible by some sentence—for example, x = ⟨snow is
white⟩—we can compute E(x) as follows:
E(x) = E snow is white〈 〉( ) = BC TRUE snow is white〈 〉( ), snow is white〈 〉( )
= BC snow is white〈 〉is true〈 〉, snow is white〈 〉( )
= snow is white〈 〉is true ↔ snow is white〈 〉
Before we can show that truth-theoretic generalisations are equivalent to infinite con-
junctions or disjunctions, we need to define another function:
PRED(x, y) =Df the proposition that results from applying (the concept) y to x.
For example, where y = ⟨green⟩, PRED(x, y) = ⟨x is green⟩.2
Finally, consider a generalisation such as ‘For all propositions v, if v is F, then v is
true’, where ‘F’ is a placeholder for a predicate of our language. Working through the
above definitions, one sees that the proposition expressed by this generalisation is
2 There are two ways to make sense of PRED. Either it could be viewed as a ‘concatenation’ function, so that, say,
⟨x is green⟩ is just the ‘concatenation’ of x and ⟨green⟩. Or one could think of concepts themselves as functions
—say, ⟨green⟩ = GREEN—so that PRED simply applies y to x.
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equivalent to the following infinite conjunction:
Lx[Proposition COND PRED x, F〈 〉( ), x( ) (3)
For instance, where x = ⟨2 + 2 = 4⟩, the value of
COND PRED x, F〈 〉( ), x( )
is the proposition ‘⟨⟨2 + 2 = 4⟩ is F → 2 + 2 = 4⟩’, which is one of the conjuncts in (3).
Thus, the proposition expressed by ‘For all propositions v, if v is F, then v is true’ is
equivalent to an infinite conjunction of propositions, none of which contains the
concept of truth.3
Remark. In order to appreciate the theoretical status of MT, one needs to appreciate
Horwich’s distinction between the minimalist conception and the minimalist theory
(which corresponds to my earlier distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘formal theory’).
The latter coincides with MT and specifies the fundamental ‘logical’ principles of
truth that account for its utility, whereas the former consists of the ‘surrounding
remarks on behalf of its adequacy’—for example, that there’s no more to ‘true’ than
its generalising function [Horwich 1998b: 6–7]. While lawlike generalisations such
as ‘A conjunction is true iff both conjuncts are true’ are to be explained on the basis
of MT, philosophical questions such as ‘Is truth susceptible to conceptual analysis?’
or ‘Is truth a substantial property?’ are answered by the minimalist conception.
Minimalism about properties. I won’t defend minimalism about truth here, but if
one finds it attractive then one can easily formulate a corresponding theory of
properties.
First, one could identify properties with concepts, as [Horwich 1998a: 4] actually
proposes. Accordingly, we paraphrase ‘x has y’ as ‘x falls under y’ and define thus:
FALLS(x, y) =Df the proposition that x falls under (the concept) y.
Now we can provide a formal theory of properties, MTP, as follows:
v is an axiom of MTP iff there′s an object x and a concept y such that v = E∗∗(x, y),
where E∗∗(x, y) = BC(FALLS(x, y), PRED(x, y)).
This is well-defined, and yields a comprehensive theory, because, even for those con-
cepts y that cannot (yet) be expressed by a predicate, we can refer to the corresponding
axiom, E**(x, y). Where y is expressible—say, y = ⟨wise⟩—we can compute E**(x, y)
explicitly:
E∗∗(x, y) = x falls under the concept wise〈 〉 ↔ x is wise〈 〉.
As before, generalisations turn out to be equivalent to infinite conjunctions or dis-
junctions. For example, the proposition expressed by ‘For all concepts v, if Plato falls
3 The reader might wonder whether it is possible to introduce a function ALL such that, when applied to the
matrix in (3), yields a finite proposition equivalent to (3). If it is, couldn’t one—on the propositional level, at
least—quantify into ‘sentence position’ without using TRUE or ⟨true⟩, thereby rendering the latter redundant?
The answer is ‘no’, or so I’ve argued elsewhere [Schindler and Schlöder ms].
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under v then Aristotle falls under v’ is equivalent to this:
Lx[Concept COND(PRED(Plato, x), PRED(Aristotle, x))
Where x = ⟨wise⟩, the value of
COND(PRED(Plato, x), PRED(Aristotle, x))
is the proposition
Plato is wise  Aristotle is wise〈 〉 (4)
which doesn’t contain reference to concepts. (Note that (4), being a singular prop-
osition, is composed of objects and concepts, but this doesn’t imply that it’s about con-
cepts, just as the sentence ‘Plato is wise’ is composed of the expressions ‘Plato’ and ‘is
wise’ without being about them. The distinction between use and mention applies to
sentences as well as propositions.)
Again, MTP is merely a formal theory specifying the fundamental ‘logical’ prin-
ciples of properties. Minimalism is the result of combining MTP with a deflationary
conception, as outlined in section 1. As in the case of truth, answers to genuine philo-
sophical questions should be expected to follow (mainly) from the deflationist con-
ception. The reason why we spent so much time in developing MTP was to show
that it’s so much as possible to provide formal principles that cohere with the tenets
of the deflationary conception—for example, that property-theoretic generalisations
are equivalent to certain infinite conjunctions and disjunctions, even if our quantifiers
range over inexpressible properties.
4. Possible Predicates
The minimalist’s solution to the problem of inexpressible properties requires the
existence of various kinds of abstract objects. Is it possible to reduce these assump-
tions? Recall that Horwich assumes every proposition to be expressed by a sentence
in some possible language. Similarly, property deflationists often assume that every
property is expressible by a predicate in some possible language (for example,
Schiffer [2003: 71]). Since there is, thus, a one-to-many relationship between prop-
erties and possible predicates, one might wonder whether deflationists can simply
replace their property talk by talk of possible predicates. I’ll suggest that this is poss-
ible if talk of possible predicates is construed de re, but untenable if it’s construed de
dicto.
It’s notoriously difficult to say what a possible predicate is, and I won’t attempt to
provide a precise criterion of identity. However, I submit the following suggestion on
the deflationist’s behalf: a possible predicate is a predicate that isn’t actually used,
rather than an object that isn’t actual.
We can flesh out this suggestion by considering Lewis’s distinction between
languages and language. On his account, languages are abstract objects, ‘semantic
systems discussed in complete abstraction from human affairs’ [Lewis 1985: 383].
On the other hand, language is a ‘rational, convention-governed human social activity’
[ibid.]. A given language is used by a given population ‘by virtue of the conventions of
language prevailing in that population’, so that ‘under suitably different conventions, a
different language would be used’ [ibid.].
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Given this distinction, one could define a possible predicate as a predicate of some
language such that, possibly, that language is used by our population. Since possible
predicates in this sense are abstract objects and therefore exist in the actual world
(because abstract objects exist in all possible worlds, if at all), quantification over poss-
ible predicates doesn’t involve quantification over merely possible objects.
To be sure, Lewis considers languages as functions from expressions to meanings,
where meanings are explained in terms of possible worlds. Instead, deflationists will
probably explain meanings in terms of usage (or something along those lines). Of
course, deflationists need to fill in the relevant details, but let’s assume for the
moment that they can meet this challenge.
If possible predicates exist, one can mention and objectually quantify over them, but
they cannot occur in predicate position in sentences of the actual language (if they did,
they would be actual, rather than possible, predicates). In particular, they cannot occur
so in an infinite conjunction of sentences of the actual language. Therefore, the appeal
to possible predicates is of little help to internalists.
If deflationists accept possible predicates, they might attempt to replace their prop-
erty talk by talk of possible predicates, as follows. Roughly, they could paraphrase ‘x has
(the property) y’ as ‘x satisfies (the possible predicate) y’; and they could paraphrase
‘There’s a property x such that A’ as ‘There’s a possible predicate x such that A*’,
where A* is the (recursively defined) paraphrase of A. (Naturally, paraphrases
commute with connectives, so that ‘For all properties x, A’ is paraphrased as ‘For all
possible predicates x, A*.’) Here, the notion of satisfaction needs to be understood
in a suitable deflationary manner.4
Crucially, this strategy assumes the actual existence of possible predicates. Defla-
tionists cannot avoid this assumption by paraphrasing ‘There’s a property x such
that A’ as ‘Possibly, there’s a predicate x such that A*.’ To see why, consider the sen-
tence ‘For all properties x, if it’s required in a great general that they have x, then Napo-
leon has x.’ According to the last proposal, this is paraphrased as ‘Necessarily, for all
predicates x, if it’s required in a great general that they satisfy x, then Napoleon
satisfies x.’ But, surely, this gets the truth-conditions wrong: it’s not necessary that
Napoleon satisfies all predicates that a great general is required to satisfy.
The problem with the last proposal is that the operator ‘possibly’ involves possible
worlds where Napoleon has properties (satisfies predicates) other than in the actual
world. One might therefore suggest using a different operator in the paraphrase—
say, ‘possibly#’, where a sentence of the form ‘Possibly#, A’ is true iff A is true in
some possible world w in which
(i) our population uses an extension of the actual language, but
(ii) for every predicate x, an object satisfies x in w iff it satisfies x in α (the actual
world).
4 As one reviewer observed, providing a suitable deflationary theory of satisfaction is non-trivial: due to the pro-
blems of inexpressibility, it cannot be given schematically. I believe that this problem can be solved by charac-
terising the axioms in analogy to MTP, though by using functions that operate on expressions (including possible
predicates) rather than propositional constituents. However, I won’t pursue this any further here, since my main
goal is merely to show that, if one wants to replace property talk by possible predicates talk, the latter can’t be
construed de dicto.
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In other words, this operator only involvesworlds inwhich every object has exactly the
same properties as in the actual one, but more properties are expressible in that world.
However, I submit that there aren’t any such worlds. If our population uses L in α
but L* in w, there must be differences in behaviour that account for this fact: our popu-
lation will conform to different conventions, have different expressions available, will
be able to express different contents, will be able to entertain different beliefs, etc.
Thus, it seems that, if property talk is to be replaced by talk of possible predicates,
the actual existence of possible predicates has to be assumed. Whether this marks a
genuine advance over minimalism is therefore debatable.
5. Predicate Quantification
According to deflationism, we engage in property talk to generalise predicate places in
our language. But if that’s all there is to our property talk, couldn’t we introduce pre-
dicate quantifiers instead and thereby avoid commitment to properties?
Initially, one might think that this can be done without incurring any substantial
theoretical costs. For instance, it’s well known that monadic second-order quantifi-
cation can be interpreted plurally [Boolos 1984]. According to the received view, plur-
alities aren’t objects, and therefore second-order quantification comes without
additional ontological commitments, if so interpreted.
However, plural quantification cannot play the same role as quantification over prop-
erties does. We frequently generalise on the position of a predicate even if the predicate
occurs in an intensional context. For example, from ‘∀x Fx ^ ¬ Necessarily ∀x Fx’, we
may infer ‘∃y(Property(y) ∧ ∀x x has y ^ ¬ Necessarily ∀x x has y).’ It’s precisely for
this reason that properties cannot be individuated extensionally. Pluralities, however,
satisfy a principle of extensionality: they have the same members in every world in
which they exist. Writing u ≺ xx for ‘u is among the xxs’, the following holds: u ≺ xx
→ Necessarily u ≺ xx. If u is among the xxs, this is necessarily so; removing u from
the xxs just results in a different plurality [Linnebo 2017]. But objects have some of
their properties contingently, and so the following doesn’t hold: u has x → Necessarily
u has x. Thus, if the language is augmentedwithmodal operators, second-order quantifi-
cation cannot be interpreted plurally.
Nor can deflationists adopt a substitutional interpretation, according to which a
formula of the form ∃VA(V) is true iff there’s a predicate ‘F’ such that A(F/V). Sub-
stitutional quantification suffers from the same problem as internalism does: there
are properties that cannot be expressed by some predicate of the actual language.
An intriguing alternative is to conceive of second-order quantification as a sui generis
form of quantification [Williamson 2013; Jones 2018; Trueman 2021]. According to this
view, second-order quantification cannot be accurately paraphrased in first-order terms.
Its semantics can only be adequately explained in a higher-order metalanguage itself.
Naturally, this view raises several questions. Is this form of quantification intelligible?
Does it induce a non-effective consequence relation? If so, should we be worried
about this? Are second-order commitments ontological or ideological, or do they
outgrow this distinction? Are they less substantial than the deflationist’s first-order com-
mitments? How can we talk about the entire hierarchy of higher-order languages to
which this view seems to give rise, if quantification across types isn’t permitted? En-
gaging with these questions is beyond the scope of this paper. My impression is that
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replacing property talk with second-order quantification is a viable option, but deflation-
ists should carefully weigh the costs and benefits of doing so.
6. Deflationism and the Existence of Abstract Objects
Let’s set to one side the higher-order approach, and return to our first-order frame-
work. I’ve argued that internalism cannot account for inexpressible properties, that
solving this problem requires quantification over certain kinds of abstract objects,
and that engaging in talk about possible predicates doesn’t help us to avoid such com-
mitment. Assuming that’s correct, what attitude should deflationists take toward their
quantifier commitments? There are (at least) three options.
First, deflationists could regard properties as ‘lightweight’ entities (a claim that
usually goes with a deflationary conception of existence). For example, properties
could be taken to be pleonastic entities (in Schiffer’s [2003] sense) or thin objects
(in Linnebo’s [2012] sense).
Second, deflationists could reject Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. For
instance, Azzouni [2004] takes mathematical statements to be literally true, but denies
that the existential quantifier bears any ontological weight. Instead, one needs to add a
genuine existence predicate that’s given in terms of some metaphysical criterion for
what exists—say, as being independent of language and thought. On the deflationist
account, properties would presumably fail to satisfy such a criterion, because they’re
merely ‘shadows of predicates’ and therefore depend on language and thought.
Alternatively, one might submit that the interesting question is not whether prop-
erties exist but instead whether properties exist at the fundamental level. Indeed, the
metaphor that properties are shadows of predicates could sensibly be cashed out as a
thesis of ontological or metaphysical priority, according to which facts about prop-
erty existence and possession are grounded in facts about primitive predication. For
instance, Horwich [1998a: 25] suggests that the fact that a has the property of being
F is ‘constituted by’ the fact that a is F. This would bring deflationism into the vicin-
ity of some recent versions of Ostrich nominalism—namely, Grounding nominalism
—that are based on such grounding claims [Imaguire 2018; Dixon 2018; Schulte
2019].5
Third, deflationists might adopt some fictionalist view of property talk. Since prop-
erty talk merely serves a quasi-logical role, it would appear that it can serve that role, no
matter whether properties exist or not. Hence, there’s little advantage in assuming that
properties really exist. This is essentially Båve’s [2015] view, who proposes an error-
theoretic view, according to which our property talk is useful but false.
Each of the three accounts has costs and benefits. Although it would require a sep-
arate paper to engage in a detailed comparison, I shall briefly indicate why I find the
error-theoretic view less attractive.
Let’s start with a less substantial worry. Although error theorists consider prop-
erty-theoretic sentences as false, they nevertheless have to admit that some of these
are correct. A well-known proposal for the case of mathematics was submitted by
Balaguer [2009], who suggests that a statement of mathematics is correct iff it
would have been true if there had actually existed mathematical objects. Båve
rejects this proposal because it relies on the controversial assumption that there
5 Thanks to a reviewer for bringing this literature to my attention.
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could be abstract objects that don’t actually exist or that there are non-vacuously
true counterpossibles. To avoid this assumption, Båve provides the following cor-
rectness conditions [2015: 49]:
A sentence S containing ‘property’ is correct just in case (i) S can be inferred from true, nomi-
nalistic sentences using valid inference rules plus [(COMP)] and (ii) every nominalistic sen-
tence which can be inferred by valid inferences plus [(COMP)] is true.
Unfortunately, this proposal seems to re-instantiate the problem that Balaguer’s cri-
terion was supposed to fix. Although Båve’s criterion works for a number of cases,
it doesn’t qualify, as being correct, certain sentences that do strike us as correct. For
example, ‘There are inexpressible properties’ seems correct but isn’t derivable from
(COMP) by using existential generalisation, precisely because there are no instances
of (COMP) for inexpressible properties. Thus, we still have to await appropriate cor-
rectness conditions.
My second worry is more substantial. According to deflationists, saying that a has
the property of being F essentially amounts to saying that a falls under the concept ⟨F⟩
or that a satisfies the predicate ‘F’. And statements of the latter form shouldn’t be
treated in an error-theoretic manner. Consider truth ascriptions. We cannot maintain
that all truth ascriptions are false, although some of them are correct. This would
simply undermine the very distinction between statements that are true and statements
that are correct but false. But the statements ‘“Plato is wise” is true’ and ‘Plato satisfies
“is wise”’ seem to be sitting in the same boat. Indeed, in Tarski’s theory of truth, the
former is defined in terms of the latter. This doesn’t imply that one cannot develop
a fictionalist account of properties, but it needs a rather different form.6
7. Conclusion
I’ve argued that, within the framework of first-order languages, the problem of inex-
pressible properties forces the deflationists to quantify over abstract objects (not to
mention that the formulation of the deflationist’s axioms becomes much more
complex), leaving essentially three options: declaring such objects to be ‘lightweight’
entities; rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment; or taking a fictionalist
attitude towards truth and satisfaction talk. Suppose that the deflationist sets aside the
(slightly more radical) second and third strategies, and adopts the first one. Is it still apt
to call such theories deflationary?
Obviously, such theories aren’t as deflationary as some deflationists (like Hofweber
or Båve) might want them to be, or as some opponents of deflationism might expect
them to be: they aren’t nominalistic. I don’t think that deflationism is wedded to
nominalism, though, and I think that it’s still apt to call such theories ‘deflationary’.
According to deflationists, properties are merely shadows of predicates or, to
borrow a phrase from van Inwagen [2004], the kind of thing ‘that can be said of some-
thing’. As such, many of the traditional metaphysical questions that substantial
accounts of properties typically address will either receive a trivial answer or make
no sense at all.
6 See Armour-Garb and Woodbridge [2015] for a pretence theory of truth that’s supposed to avoid the last
objection.
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Are there logical, disjunctive, uninstantiated, etc. properties? Yes, there are, because
properties answer a need to generalise predicate places, and our language abounds with
logical, disjunctive, etc. predicates. What makes it that a and b share the property of
being F? Well, that both of them are F. Can properties be perceived? Are they
wholly present wherever their instances are located? Are objects bundles of properties?
If properties are lightweight entities, or identified with concepts or possible predicates,
these questions will be answered in the negative.7 And so on.
Thus, deflationary theories deflate many traditional questions about properties. Of
course, they also generate difficult problems of their own. For instance, the formulation
of MTP presupposes the existence of structured propositions, which some philoso-
phers find problematic due to the Russell-Myhill paradox. Moreover, the theories dis-
cussed in sections 3 and 4 rely, directly or indirectly, on the controversial notion of a
possible predicate. Note, though, that many of the problems confronting deflationary
property theories aren’t created by the latter, but rather are inherited from the defla-
tionary theories of truth on which they are modelled. I’m inclined to conclude that
if truth deflationism is a tenable position, then so is deflationism about properties.8
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